annotate docs/rfcs/draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-09.txt @ 877:998f2a109150

Updated Catalan translation.

                                                    Paul Ford-Hutchinson
<draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-09.txt>                            IBM UK Ltd
                                                        Martin Carpenter
                                                            Verisign Inc
                                                              Tim Hudson
INTERNET-DRAFT (draft)                                 RSA Australia Ltd
                                                             Eric Murray
                                                        Wave Systems Inc
                                                          Volker Wiegand
                                                              SuSE Linux

                                                         2nd April, 2002
This document expires on 2nd October, 2002


                         Securing FTP with TLS


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html













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Index
      1. .......... Abstract
      2. .......... Introduction
      3. .......... Audience
      4. .......... Session negotiation on the control port
      5. .......... Response to FEAT command
      6. .......... Data Connection Behaviour
      7. .......... Mechanisms for the AUTH Command
      8. .......... Data Connection Security
      9. .......... A discussion of negotiation behaviour
      10. ......... Who negotiates what, where and how
      11. ......... Timing Diagrams
      12. ......... Discussion of the REIN command
      13. ......... Discussion of the STAT and ABOR commands
      14. ......... Security Considerations
      15. ......... IANA Considerations
      16. ......... Other Parameters
      17. ......... Network Management
      18. ......... Internationalization
      19. ......... Scalability & Limits
      20. ......... Applicability
      21. ......... Acknowledgements
      22. ......... References
      23. ......... Authors' Contact Addresses



























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1. Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism that can be used by FTP clients
   and servers to implement security and authentication using the TLS
   protocol defined by [RFC-2246] and the extensions to the FTP protocol
   defined by [RFC-2228].  It describes the subset of the extensions
   that are required and the parameters to be used; discusses some of
   the policy issues that clients and servers will need to take;
   considers some of the implications of those policies and discusses
   some expected behaviours of implementations to allow interoperation.
   This document is intended to provide TLS support for FTP in a similar
   way to that provided for SMTP in [RFC-2487] and HTTP in [RFC-2817].

   TLS is not the only mechanism for securing file transfer, however it
   does offer some of the following positive attributes:-

      - Flexible security levels.  TLS can support confidentiality,
      integrity, authentication or some combination of all of these.
      This allows clients and servers to dynamically, during a session,
      decide on the level of security required for a particular data
      transfer,

      - It is possible to use TLS identities to authenticate client
      users and not just client hosts.

      - Formalised public key management.  By use of well established
      client identity mechnisms (supported by TLS) during the
      authentication phase, certificate management may be built into a
      central function.  Whilst this may not be desirable for all uses
      of secured file transfer, it offers advantages in certain
      structured environments.

      - Co-existence and interoperation with authentication mechanisms
      that are already in place for the HTTPS protocol.  This allows web
      browsers to incorporate secure file transfer using the same
      infrastructure that has been set up to allow secure web browsing.

   The TLS protocol is a development of the Netscape Communication
   Corporation's SSL protocol and this document can be used to allow the
   FTP protocol to be used with either SSL or TLS.  The actual protocol
   used will be decided by the negotiation of the protected session by
   the TLS/SSL layer.  This document will only refer to the TLS
   protocol, however, it is understood that the Client and Server MAY
   actually be using SSL if they are so configured.

   Note that this specification is in accordance with the FTP RFC
   [RFC-959] and relies on the TLS protocol [RFC-2246] and the FTP
   security extensions [RFC-2228].



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2.  Introduction

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
    "SHALL NOT",  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and
   "OPTIONAL" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as
   described in [RFC-2119].

   This document is an attempt to describe how three other documents
   should combined to provide a useful, interoperable, secure file
   transfer protocol.  Those documents are:-


      RFC 959 [RFC-959]

         The description of the Internet File Transfer Protocol

      RFC 2246 [RFC-2246]

         The description of the Transport Layer Security protocol
         (developed from the Netscape Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
         protocol version 3.0).

      RFC 2228 [RFC-2228]

         Extensions to the FTP protocol to allow negotiation of security
         mechanisms to allow authentication, confidentiality and message
         integrity.

   The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in [RFC-959] and
   in place on the Internet is an excellent mechanism for exchanging
   files.  The security extensions to FTP in [RFC-2228] offer a
   comprehensive set of commands and responses that can be used to add
   authentication, integrity and confidentiality to the FTP protocol.
   The TLS protocol is a popular (due to its wholesale adoption in the
   HTTP environment) mechanism for generally securing a socket
   connection.
   There are many ways in which these three protocols can be combined
   which would ensure that interoperation is impossible.  This document
   describes one method by which FTP can operate securely in such a way
   as to provide both flexibility and interoperation.  This necessitates
   a brief description of the actual negotiation mechanism ; a much more
   detailed description of the policies and practices that would be
   required and a discussion of the expected behaviours of clients and
   servers to allow either party to impose their security requirements
   on the FTP session.


3.  Audience



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   This document is aimed at developers who wish to implement TLS as a
   security mechanism to secure FTP clients and/or servers.


4.  Session negotiation on the control port

   The server listens on the normal FTP control port {FTP-PORT} and the
   session initiation is not secured at all.  Once the client wishes to
   secure the session, the AUTH command is sent and the server MAY then
   allow TLS negotiation to take place.

  4.1  Client wants a secured session

     If a client wishes to attempt to secure a session then it SHOULD,
     in accordance with [RFC-2228] send the AUTH command with the
     parameter requesting TLS {TLS-PARM}.


     The client then needs to behave according to its policies depending
     on the response received from the server and also the result of the
     TLS negotiation.  i.e. A client which receives an AUTH rejection
     MAY choose to continue with the session unprotected if it so
     desires.

  4.2  Server wants a secured session

     The FTP protocol does not allow a server to directly dictate client
     behaviour, however the same effect can be achieved by refusing to
     accept certain FTP commands until the session is secured to an
     acceptable level to the server.

   The server response to an 'AUTH TLS' command which it will honour, is
   '234'.

      Note. The '334' response as defined in [RFC-2228] implies that an
      ADAT exchange will folow.  This document does not use the ADAT
      command and so the '334' reply is incorrect.

   Note. The FTP protocol insists that a USER command be used to
   identify the entity attempting to use the ftp server.  Although the
   TLS negotiation may be providing authentication information the USER
   command must still be isssued by the client.  However, it will be a
   server implementation issue to decide which credentials to accept and
   what consistency checks to make between any client cert used and the
   parameter on the USER command.

5.  Response to the FEAT command




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   The FEAT command (introduced in [RFC-2389]) allows servers with
   additional features to advertise these to a client by responding to
   the FEAT command.  If a server supports the FEAT command then it MUST
   advertise supported AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands in the reply as
   described in section 3.2 of [RFC-2389].  Additionally, the AUTH
   command should have a reply that identifies 'TLS' as one of the
   possible parameters to AUTH.  It is not necessary to identify the
   'TLS-C' synonym separately.

   Example reply (in same style is [RFC-2389])
      C> FEAT
      S> 211-Extensions supported
      S>  AUTH TLS
      S>  PBSZ
      S>  PROT
      S> 211 END


6. Data Connection Behaviour

   The Data Connection in the FTP model can be used in one of three
   ways.  (Note: these descriptions are not necessarily placed in exact
   chronological order, but do describe the steps required. - See
   diagrams later for clarification)

         i) Classic FTP client/server data exchange

         - The client obtains a port; sends the port number to the
         server; the server connects to the client.  The client issues a
         send or receive request to the server on the control connection
         and the data transfer commences on the data connection.

         ii) Firewall-Friendly client/server data exchange (as discussed
         in [RFC-1579]) using the PASV command to reverse the direction
         of the data connection.

         - The client requests that the server open a port; the server
         obtains a port and returns the address and port number to the
         client; the client connects to the server on this port.  The
         client issues a send or receive request on the control
         connection and the data transfer commences on the data
         connection.

         iii) Client initiated server/server data exchange (proxy or
         PASV connections)

         - The client requests that server A opens a port; server A
         obtains a port and returns it to the client; the client sends



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         this port number to server B.  Server B connects to server A.
         The client sends a send or receive request to server A and the
         complement to server B and the data transfer commences.  In
         this model server A is the proxy or PASV host and is a client
         for the Data Connection to server B.

   For i) and ii) the FTP client MUST be the TLS client and the FTP
   server MUST be the TLS server.

   That is to say, it does not matter which side initiates the
   connection with a connect() call or which side reacts to the
   connection via the accept() call; the FTP client as defined in
   [RFC-959] is always the TLS client as defined in [RFC-2246].

   In scenario iii) there is a problem in that neither server A nor
   server B is the TLS client given the fact that an FTP server must act
   as a TLS server for Firewall-Friendly FTP [RFC-1579].  Thus this is
   explicitly excluded in the security extensions document [RFC-2228],
   and in this document.



7. Mechanisms for the AUTH Command

   The AUTH command takes a single parameter to define the security
   mechanism to be negotiated.  As the SSL/TLS protocols self-negotiate
   their levels there is no need to distinguish SSL vs TLS in the
   application layer.  The proposed mechanism name for negotiating TLS
   will be the character string identified in {TLS-PARM}.  This will
   allow the client and server to negotiate TLS on the control
   connection without altering the protection of the data channel.  To
   protect the data channel as well, the PBSZ:PROT command sequence MUST
   be used.

   Note: The data connection state MAY be modified by the client issuing
   the PROT command with the new desired level of data channel
   protection and the server replying in the affirmative.  This data
   channel protection negotiation can happen at any point in the session
   (even straight after a PORT or PASV command) and as often as is
   required.

      See also Section 15, "IANA Considerations".


8. Data Connection Security

   The Data Connection security level is determined by the PROT command




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      The PROT command, as specified in [RFC-2228] allows client/server
      negotiation of the security level of the data connection.  Once a
      PROT command has been issued by the client and accepted by the
      server returning the '200' reply, the security of subsequent data
      connections MUST be at that level until another PROT command is
      issued and accepted; the session ends; a REIN command is issued;
      or the security of the session (via an AUTH command) is re-
      negotiated.

   Data Connection Security Negotiation (the PROT command)

      Note: In line with [RFC-2228], there is no facility for securing
      the Data connection with an insecure Control connection.
      Specifically, the PROT command MUST be preceded by a PBSZ command
      and a PBSZ command MUST be preceded by a successful security data
      exchange (the TLS negotiation in this case)

      The command defined in [RFC-2228] to negotiate data connection
      security is the PROT command.  As defined there are four values
      that the PROT command parameter can take.

          'C' - Clear - neither Integrity nor Privacy

          'S' - Safe - Integrity without Privacy

          'E' - Confidential - Privacy without Integrity

          'P' - Private - Integrity and Privacy

      As TLS negotiation encompasses (and exceeds) the Safe /
      Confidential / Private distinction, only Private (use TLS) and
      Clear (don't use TLS) are used.

      For TLS, the data connection can have one of two security levels.

         1)Clear (requested by 'PROT C')

         2)Private (requested by 'PROT P')

      With 'Clear' protection level, the data connection is made without
      TLS at all.  Thus the connection is unauthenticated and has no
      confidentiality or integrity.  This might be the desired behaviour
      for servers sending file lists, pre-encrypted data or non-
      sensitive data (e.g. for anonymous FTP servers).

      If the data connection security level is 'Private' then a TLS
      negotiation must take place on the data connection, to the
      satisfaction of the Client and Server prior to any data being



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      transmitted over the connection.  The TLS layers of the Client and
      Server will be responsible for negotiating the exact TLS Cipher
      Suites that will be used (and thus the eventual security of the
      connection).


      In addition, the PBSZ (protection buffer size) command, as
      detailed in [RFC-2228], is compulsory prior to any PROT command.
      This document also defines a data channel encapsulation mechanism
      for protected data buffers.  For FTP-TLS, which appears to the FTP
      application as a streaming protection mechanism, this is not
      required.  Thus the PBSZ command must still be issued, but must
      have a parameter of '0' to indicate that no buffering is taking
      place and the data connection should not be encapsulated.
       Note that PBSZ 0 is not in the grammar of [RFC-2228], section
      8.1, where it is stated:
         PBSZ <sp> <decimal-integer> <CRLF> <decimal-integer> ::= any
         decimal integer from 1 to (2^32)-1
      However it should be noted that using a value of '0' to mean a
      streaming protocol is a reasonable use of '0' for that parameter
      and is not ambiguous.

   Initial Data Connection Security

      The initial state of the data connection MUST be 'Clear' (this is
      the behaviour as indicated by [RFC-2228].)


9. A Discussion of Negotiation Behaviour

   9.1. The server's view of the control connection

      A server MAY have a policy statement somewhere that might:

         - Deny any command before TLS is negotiated (this might cause
         problems if a SITE or some such command is required prior to
         login)
         - Deny certain commands before TLS is negotiated (such as USER,
         PASS or ACCT)
         - Deny insecure USER commands for certain users (e.g. not
         ftp/anonymous)
         - Deny secure USER commands for certain users (e.g.
         ftp/anonymous)
         - Define the level(s) of TLS to be allowed
         - Define the CipherSuites allowed to be used (perhaps on a per
         host/domain/...  basis)
         - Allow TLS authentication as a substitute for local
         authentication.



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         - Define data connection policies (see next section)

         It is possible that the TLS negotiation may not be completed
         satisfactorily for the server, in which case it can be one of
         these states.

            The TLS negotiation failed completely

         In this case, the control connection should still be up in
         unprotected mode and the server SHOULD issue an unprotected
         '421' reply to end the session.

            The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the server
            decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g.
            Distinguished Name in the client certificate is not
            permitted to use the server)

         In this case, the control connection should still be up in a
         protected state, so the server MAY either continue to refuse to
         service commands or issue a protected '421' reply and close the
         connection.

            The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

         In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state and
         the server SHOULD simply drop the control connection.

      Server code will be responsible for implementing the required
      policies and ensuring that the client is prevented from
      circumventing the chosen security by refusing to service those
      commands that are against policy.

   9.2. The server's view of the data connection

      The server can take one of four basic views of the data connection

         1 - Don't allow encryption at all (in which case the PROT
         command should not allow any value other than 'C' - if it is
         allowed at all)
         2 - Allow the client to choose protection or not
         3 - Insist on data protection (in which case the PROT command
         must be issued prior to the first attempted data transfer)
         4 - Decide on one of the above three for each and every data
         connection

      The server SHOULD only check the status of the data protection
      level (for options 3 and 4 above) on the actual command that will
      initiate the data transfer (and not on the PORT or PASV).  The



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      following commands, defined in [RFC-959] cause data connections to
      be opened and thus may be rejected (before any 1xx) message due to
      an incorrect PROT setting.


         STOR
         RETR
         NLST
         LIST
         STOU
         APPE


      The reply to indicate that the PROT setting is incorrect is
       '521 data connection cannot be opened with this PROT setting'
      If the protection level indicates that TLS is required, then it
      should be negotiated once the data connection is made.  Thus, the
      '150' reply only states that the command can be used given the
      current PROT level.  Should the server not like the TLS
      negotiation then it will close the data port immediately and
      follow the '150' command with a '522' reply indicating that the
      TLS negotiation failed or was unacceptable.  (Note: this means
      that the application can pass a standard list of CipherSuites to
      the TLS layer for negotiation and review the one negotiated for
      applicability in each instance).

      It is quite reasonable for the server to insist that the data
      connection uses a TLS cached session.  This might be a cache of a
      previous data connection or of the control connection.  If this is
      the reason for the the refusal to allow the data transfer then the
      '522' reply should indicate this.
      Note: this has an important impact on client design, but allows
      servers to minimise the cycles used during TLS negotiation by
      refusing to perform a full negotiation with a previously
      authenticated client.

      It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the server will
      be authentication of the server host itself and not a user on the
      server host.

   9.3. The client's view of the control connection

      In most cases it is likely that the client will be using TLS
      because the server would refuse to interact insecurely.  To allow
      for this, clients SHOULD be able to be flexible enough to manage
      the securing of a session at the appropriate time and still allow
      the user/server policies to dictate exactly when in the session
      the security is negotiated.



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      In the case where it is the client that is insisting on the
      securing of the session, it will need to ensure that the
      negotiations are all completed satisfactorily and will need to be
      able to inform the user sensibly should the server not support, or
      be prepared to use, the required security levels.

      Clients SHOULD be coded in such a manner as to allow the timing of
      the AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands to be flexible and dictated by
      the server.  It is quite reasonable for a server to refuse certain
      commands prior to these commands, similarly it is quite possible
      that a SITE or quoted command might be needed by a server prior to
      the AUTH.  A client MUST allow a user to override the timing of
      these commands to suit a specific server.
      For example, a client SHOULD NOT insist on sending the AUTH as the
      first command in a session, nor should it insist on issuing a
      PBSZ, PROT pair directly after the AUTH.  This may well be the
      default behaviour, but must be overridable by a user.

      Note: The TLS negotiation may not be completed satisfactorily for
      the client, in which case it will be in one of these states:

            The TLS negotiation failed completely

            In this case, the control connection should still be up in
            unprotected mode and the client should issue an unprotected
            QUIT command to end the session.

            The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the client
            decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g.
            Distinguished Name in certificate is not the actual server
            expected)

            In this case, the control connection should still be up in a
            protected state, so the client should issue a protected QUIT
            command to end the session.

            The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

            In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state
            and the client should simply drop the control connection.

   9.4. The client's view of the data connection

   Client security policies

      Clients do not typically have 'policies' as such, instead they
      rely on the user defining their actions and, to a certain extent,
      are reactive to the server policy.  Thus a client will need to



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      have commands that will allow the user to switch the protection
      level of the data connection dynamically, however, there may be a
      general 'policy' that attempts all LIST and NLST commands on a
      Clear connection first (and automatically switches to Private if
      it fails).  In this case there would need to be a user command
      available to ensure that a given data transfer was not attempted
      on an insecure data connection.

      Clients also need to understand that the level of the PROT setting
      is only checked for a particular data transfer after that transfer
      has been requested.  Thus a refusal by the server to accept a
      particular data transfer should not be read by the client as a
      refusal to accept that data protection level in toto, as not only
      may other data transfers be acceptable at that protection level,
      but it is entirely possible that the same transfer may be accepted
      at the same protection level at a later point in the session.

      It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the client
      should be authentication of a user on the client host and not the
      client host itself.































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10. Who negotiates what, where and how

   10.1. Do we protect at all ?

      Client issues 'AUTH TLS', server accepts or rejects.
      If server needs AUTH, then it refuses to accept certain commands
      until it gets a successfully protected session.

   10.2. What level of protection do we use on the Control connection ?

      Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

   10.3. Do we protect data connections in general ?

      Client issues PROT command, server accepts or rejects.


   10.4. Is protection required for a particular data transfer ?

      A client would already have issued a PROT command if it required
      the connection to be protected.
      If a server needs to have the connection protected then it will
      reply to the STOR/RETR/NLST/... command with a '522' indicating
      that the current state of the data connection protection level is
      not sufficient for that data transfer at that time.

   10.5. What level of protection is required for a particular data
   transfer ?

      Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

   Thus it can be seen that, for flexibility, it is desirable for the
   FTP application to be able to interact with the TLS layer upon which
   it sits to define and discover the exact TLS CipherSuites that are to
   be/have been negotiated and make decisions accordingly.
















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11. Timing Diagrams

   11.1. Establishing a protected session

           Client                                 Server
  control          data                   data               control
====================================================================

                                                             socket()
                                                             bind()
  socket()
  connect()  ----------------------------------------------> accept()
            <----------------------------------------------  220
  AUTH TLS   ---------------------------------------------->
            <----------------------------------------------  234
  TLSneg()  <----------------------------------------------> TLSneg()
  PBSZ 0     ---------------------------------------------->
            <----------------------------------------------  200
  PROT P     ---------------------------------------------->
            <----------------------------------------------  200
  USER fred  ---------------------------------------------->
            <----------------------------------------------  331
  PASS pass  ---------------------------------------------->
            <----------------------------------------------  230

Note 1: the order of the PBSZ/PROT pair and the USER/PASS pair (with
respect to each other) is not important (i.e. the USER/PASS can happen
prior to the PBSZ/PROT - or indeed the server can refuse to allow a
PBSZ/PROT pair until the USER/PASS pair has happened).

Note 2: the PASS command might not be required at all (if the USER
parameter and any client identity presented provide sufficient
authentication).  The server would indicate this by issuing a '232'
reply to the USER command instead of the '331' which requests a PASS
from the client.

Note 3: the AUTH command might not be the first command after the
receipt of the 220 welcome message.













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   11.2. A standard data transfer without protection.

           Client                                 Server
  control          data                   data               control
====================================================================

                   socket()
                   bind()
  PORT w,x,y,z,a,b ----------------------------------------->
      <----------------------------------------------------- 200
  STOR file ------------------------------------------------>
                                          socket()
                                          bind()
      <----------------------------------------------------- 150
                   accept() <-----------  connect()
                   write()   -----------> read()
                   close()   -----------> close()
      <----------------------------------------------------- 226

































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   11.3. A firewall-friendly data transfer without protection

           Client                                 Server
  control          data                   data               control
====================================================================

  PASV -------------------------------------------------------->
                                          socket()
                                          bind()
      <------------------------------------------ 227 (w,x,y,z,a,b)
                   socket()
  STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
                   connect()  ----------> accept()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 150
                   write()    ----------> read()
                   close()    ----------> close()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 226


    Note: Implementors should be aware that then connect()/accept()
    function is performed prior to the receipt of the reply from the
    STOR command. This contrasts with situation when (non-firewall-
    friendly) PORT is used prior to the STOR, and the accept()/connect()
    is performed after the reply from the aforementioned STOR has been
    dealt with.


























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   11.4. A standard data transfer with protection

           Client                                 Server
  control          data                   data               control
====================================================================

                   socket()
                   bind()
  PORT w,x,y,z,a,b -------------------------------------------->
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 200
  STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
                                          socket()
                                          bind()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 150
                   accept()  <----------  connect()
                   TLSneg()  <----------> TLSneg()
                   TLSwrite() ----------> TLSread()
                   TLSshutdown() -------> TLSshutdown()
                   close()    ----------> close()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 226































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   11.5. A firewall-friendly data transfer with protection

           Client                                 Server
  control          data                   data               control
====================================================================

  PASV -------------------------------------------------------->
                                          socket()
                                          bind()
      <------------------------------------------ 227 (w,x,y,z,a,b)
                   socket()
  STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
                   connect()  ----------> accept()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 150
                   TLSneg()   <---------> TLSneg()
                   TLSwrite()  ---------> TLSread()
                   TLSshutdown() -------> TLSshutdown()
                   close()     ---------> close()
      <-------------------------------------------------------- 226
































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12. Discussion of the REIN command

   The REIN command, defined in [RFC-959], allows the user to reset the
   state of the FTP session.  From [RFC-959]:
      REINITIALIZE (REIN)
         This command terminates a USER, flushing all I/O and account
         information, except to allow any transfer in progress to be
         completed.  All parameters are reset to the default settings
         and the control connection is left open.  This is identical to
         the state in which a user finds himself immediately after the
         control connection is opened.  A USER command may be expected
         to follow.
   When this command is processed by the server,  the TLS session(s)
   MUST be cleared and the control and data connections revert to
   unprotected, clear communications.  It MAY be acceptable to use
   cached TLS sessions for subsequent connections, however a server MUST
   not mandate this.


































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13. Discussion of the STAT and ABOR commands

   The ABOR and STAT commands and the use of TCP Urgent Pointers

      [RFC-959] describes the use of Telnet commands (IP and DM) and the
      TCP Urgent pointer to indicate the transmission of commands on the
      control channel during the execution of a data transfer.  FTP uses
      the Telnet Interrupt Process and Data Mark commands in conjunction
      with Urgent data to preface two commands: ABOR (Abort Transfer)
      and STAT (Status request).

      The Urgent Pointer was used because in a Unix implementation the
      receipt of a TCP packet marked as Urgent would result in the the
      execution of the SIGURG interrupt handler.  This reliance on
      interrupt handlers was necessary on systems which did not
      implement select() or did not support multiple threads.  TLS does
      not support the notion of Urgent data.

      When TLS is implemented as a security method in FTP the server
      SHOULD NOT rely on the use of SIGURG to process input on the
      control channel during data transfers.  The client MUST send all
      data including Telnet commands across the TLS session.  The TLS
      session will be corrupted if any data is sent on a socket while
      TLS is active.



























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14. Security Considerations

   This entire document deals with security considerations related to
   the File Transfer Protocol.

   14.1. Verification of Authentication tokens

      14.1.1. Server Certificates

         Although it is entirely an implementation decision, it is
         recommended that certificates used for server authentication of
         the TLS session contain the server identification information
         in a similar manner to those used for http servers.  (see
         [RFC-2818])

         Similarly, it is recommended that the certificate used for
         server authentication of Data connections is the same
         certificate as that used for the corresponding Control
         connection.

      14.1.2. Client Certificates

         - Deciding which client certificates to allow and defining
         which fields define what authentication information is entirely
         a server implementation issue.

         - It is also server implementation issue to decide if the
         authentication token presented for the data connection must
         match the one used for the corresponding control connection.

   14.2. Addressing FTP Security Considerations [RFC-2577]

      14.2.1. Bounce Attack

         A bounce attack should be harder in a secured FTP environment
         because:

            - The FTP server that is being used to initiate a false
            connection will always be a 'server' in the TLS context.
            Therefore, only services that act as 'clients' in the TLS
            context could be vulnerable.  This would be a counter-
            intuitive way to implement TLS on a service.

            - The FTP server would detect that the authentication
            credentials for the data connection are not the same as
            those for the control connection, thus the server policies
            COULD be set to drop the data connection.




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            - Genuine users are less likely to initiate such attacks
            when the authentication is strong and malicious users are
            less likely to gain access to the FTP server if the
            authentication is not easily subverted (password guessing,
            network tracing, etc...)

      14.2.2. Restricting Access

         This document presents a strong mechanism for solving the issue
         raised in this section.

      14.2.3. Protecting Passwords

         The twin solutions of strong authentication and data
         confidentiality ensure that this is not an issue when TLS is
         used to protect the control session.

      14.2.4. Privacy

         The TLS protocol ensures data confidentiality by encryption.
         Privacy (e.g. access to download logs, user profile
         information, etc...) is outside the scope of this document (and
         [RFC-2577] presumably)

      14.2.5. Protecting Usernames

         This is not an issue when TLS is used as the primary
         authentication mechanism.

      14.2.6. Port Stealing

         This proposal will do little for the Denial of Service element
         of this section, however, strong authentication on the data
         connection will prevent unauthorised connections retrieving or
         submitting files.

      14.2.7. Software-Base Security Problems

         Nothing in this proposal will affect the discussion in this
         section.


15. IANA Considerations

   {FTP-PORT} - The port assigned to the FTP control connection is 21.

16. Other Parameters




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   {TLS-PARM} - The parameter for the AUTH command to indicate that TLS
   is required.  To request the TLS protocol in accordance with this
   document, the client MUST use 'TLS'

      To maintain backward compatability with older versions of this
      document, the server SHOULD accept 'TLS-C' as a synonym for 'TLS'

         Note - [RFC-2228] states that these parameters are case-
         insensitive.


17. Network Management

   NONE


18. Internationalization

   NONE


19. Scalability & Limits

   There are no issues other than those concerned with the ability of
   the server to refuse to have a complete TLS negotiation for each and
   every data connection, which will allow servers to retain throughput
   whilst using cycles only when necessary.
























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20. Applicability

   This mechanism is generally applicable as a mechanism for securing
   the FTP protocol.  It is unlikely that anonymous FTP clients or
   servers will require such security (although some might like the
   authentication features without the confidentiality).


21. Acknowledgements

   o Netscape Communications Corporation for the original SSL protocol.

   o Eric Young for the SSLeay libraries.

   o University of California, Berkley for the original implementations
   of FTP and ftpd on which the initial implementation of these
   extensions were layered.

   o IETF CAT working group.

   o IETF TLS working group.

   o IETF FTPEXT working group.

   o Jeff Altman for the ABOR and STAT discussion.


























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22. References

   [RFC-959] J. Postel, "File Transfer Protocol"
      RFC 959, October 1985.

   [RFC-1579] S. Bellovin, "Firewall-Friendly FTP"
      RFC 1579, February 1994.

   [RFC-2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels"
      RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC-2222] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer"
      RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [RFC-2228] M. Horowitz, S. Lunt, "FTP Security Extensions"
      RFC 2228, October 1997.

   [RFC-2246] T. Dierks, C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"
      RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC-2389] P Hethmon, R.Elz, "Feature Negotiation Mechanism for the
   File Transfer Protocol"
      RFC 2389, August 1998.

   [RFC-2487] P Hoffman, "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
   TLS"
      RFC 2487, January 1999.

   [RFC-2577] M Allman, S Ostermann, "FTP Security Considerations"
      RFC 2577, May 1999.

   [RFC-2817] R. Khare, S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1"
      RFC 2817, May 2000.

   [RFC-2818] E. Rescorla,  "HTTP Over TLS"
      RFC 2818, May 2000.














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23. Authors' Contact Addresses

The FTP-TLS draft information site is at http://www.ford-
hutchinson.com/~fh-1-pfh/ftps-ext.html


Please send comments to Paul Ford-Hutchinson at the address below

        Tim Hudson                  Paul Ford-Hutchinson
           RSA Data Security           IBM UK Ltd
             Australia Pty Ltd         PO Box 31
                                       Birmingham Road
                                       Warwick
                                       United Kingdom
  tel -   [phone]             [phone]
  fax -   [phone]             [phone]
email - [e-mail]    [e-mail]

        Martin Carpenter            Eric Murray
           Verisign Ltd                Wave Systems Inc.
email -  [e-mail]    [e-mail]

        Volker Wiegand
           SuSE Linux
email -  [e-mail]


























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   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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