# HG changeset patch # User Stu Tomlinson # Date 1290477372 0 # Node ID 27c56e6b5fa6329b35775c26c7986e37d46d94cf # Parent 43af903bd8166f758cd8c456c8506cfd4a937ddc Our certificate code is generally designed around no two CA certificates having the same DN. Unfortunately this breaks when have multiple distinct intermediate certificates with the same DN, such as when we want to validate against MSN intermediate CAs. This change allows us to verify against any one of multiple CA certificates with the same DN, instead of relying on a) luck from reading from disk in the "right" order or b) black magic from NSS reconstructing a valid chain on connection attempts after CA pool initialization is complete. diff -r 43af903bd816 -r 27c56e6b5fa6 libpurple/certificate.c --- a/libpurple/certificate.c Tue Nov 23 01:50:30 2010 +0000 +++ b/libpurple/certificate.c Tue Nov 23 01:56:12 2010 +0000 @@ -947,6 +947,22 @@ return NULL; } +static GSList * +x509_ca_locate_certs(GList *lst, const gchar *dn) +{ + GList *cur; + GSList *crts = NULL; + + for (cur = lst; cur; cur = cur->next) { + x509_ca_element *el = cur->data; + if (purple_strequal(dn, el->dn)) { + crts = g_slist_prepend(crts, el); + } + } + return crts; +} + + static gboolean x509_ca_cert_in_pool(const gchar *id) { @@ -985,6 +1001,31 @@ return crt; } +static GSList * +x509_ca_get_certs(const gchar *id) +{ + GSList *crts = NULL, *els = NULL; + + g_return_val_if_fail(x509_ca_lazy_init(), NULL); + g_return_val_if_fail(id, NULL); + + /* Search the memory-cached pool */ + els = x509_ca_locate_certs(x509_ca_certs, id); + + if (els != NULL) { + GSList *cur; + /* Make a copy of the memcached ones for the function caller + to play with */ + for (cur = els; cur; cur = cur->next) { + x509_ca_element *el = cur->data; + crts = g_slist_prepend(crts, purple_certificate_copy(el->crt)); + } + g_slist_free(els); + } + + return crts; +} + static gboolean x509_ca_put_cert(const gchar *id, PurpleCertificate *crt) { @@ -1558,7 +1599,9 @@ PurpleCertificate *ca_crt, *end_crt; PurpleCertificate *failing_crt; GList *chain = vrq->cert_chain; + GSList *ca_crts, *cur; GByteArray *last_fpr, *ca_fpr; + gboolean valid = FALSE; gchar *ca_id; peer_crt = (PurpleCertificate *) chain->data; @@ -1646,8 +1689,8 @@ purple_debug_info("certificate/x509/tls_cached", "Checking for a CA with DN=%s\n", ca_id); - ca_crt = purple_certificate_pool_retrieve(ca, ca_id); - if ( NULL == ca_crt ) { + ca_crts = x509_ca_get_certs(ca_id); + if ( NULL == ca_crts ) { flags |= PURPLE_CERTIFICATE_CA_UNKNOWN; purple_debug_warning("certificate/x509/tls_cached", @@ -1677,24 +1720,33 @@ * the list, so here we are. */ last_fpr = purple_certificate_get_fingerprint_sha1(end_crt); - ca_fpr = purple_certificate_get_fingerprint_sha1(ca_crt); + for (cur = ca_crts; cur; cur = cur->next) { + ca_crt = cur->data; + ca_fpr = purple_certificate_get_fingerprint_sha1(ca_crt); - if ( !byte_arrays_equal(last_fpr, ca_fpr) && - !purple_certificate_signed_by(end_crt, ca_crt) ) - { - /* TODO: If signed_by ever returns a reason, maybe mention - that, too. */ - /* TODO: Also mention the CA involved. While I could do this - now, a full DN is a little much with which to assault the - user's poor, leaky eyes. */ - flags |= PURPLE_CERTIFICATE_INVALID_CHAIN; + if ( byte_arrays_equal(last_fpr, ca_fpr) || + purple_certificate_signed_by(end_crt, ca_crt) ) + { + /* TODO: If signed_by ever returns a reason, maybe mention + that, too. */ + /* TODO: Also mention the CA involved. While I could do this + now, a full DN is a little much with which to assault the + user's poor, leaky eyes. */ + valid = TRUE; + g_byte_array_free(ca_fpr, TRUE); + break; + } + + g_byte_array_free(ca_fpr, TRUE); } - g_byte_array_free(ca_fpr, TRUE); + if (valid == FALSE) + flags |= PURPLE_CERTIFICATE_INVALID_CHAIN; + + g_slist_foreach(ca_crts, (GFunc)purple_certificate_destroy, NULL); + g_slist_free(ca_crts); g_byte_array_free(last_fpr, TRUE); - purple_certificate_destroy(ca_crt); - x509_tls_cached_check_subject_name(vrq, flags); }