Mercurial > pidgin
diff src/protocols/oscar/auth.c @ 2703:441b84ab7f4e
[gaim-migrate @ 2716]
it's not what you think
committer: Tailor Script <tailor@pidgin.im>
author | Eric Warmenhoven <eric@warmenhoven.org> |
---|---|
date | Sat, 10 Nov 2001 01:48:17 +0000 |
parents | 933346315b9b |
children | fee85ed7fc3f |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/src/protocols/oscar/auth.c Sat Nov 10 01:30:13 2001 +0000 +++ b/src/protocols/oscar/auth.c Sat Nov 10 01:48:17 2001 +0000 @@ -1,15 +1,24 @@ /* - * aim_auth.c - * - * Deals with the authorizer. + * Deals with the authorizer (group 0x0017=23, and old-style non-SNAC login). * */ #define FAIM_INTERNAL #include <aim.h> -/* this just pushes the passed cookie onto the passed connection -- NO SNAC! */ -faim_export int aim_auth_sendcookie(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const fu8_t *chipsahoy) +#include "md5.h" + +static int aim_encode_password(const char *password, unsigned char *encoded); + +/* + * This just pushes the passed cookie onto the passed connection, without + * the SNAC header or any of that. + * + * Very commonly used, as every connection except auth will require this to + * be the first thing you send. + * + */ +faim_export int aim_sendcookie(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const fu8_t *chipsahoy) { aim_frame_t *fr; aim_tlvlist_t *tl = NULL; @@ -28,6 +37,328 @@ } /* + * Normally the FLAP version is sent as the first few bytes of the cookie, + * meaning you generally never call this. + * + * But there are times when something might want it seperate. Specifically, + * libfaim sends this internally when doing SNAC login. + * + */ +faim_export int aim_sendflapver(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn) +{ + aim_frame_t *fr; + + if (!(fr = aim_tx_new(sess, conn, AIM_FRAMETYPE_FLAP, 0x01, 4))) + return -ENOMEM; + + aimbs_put32(&fr->data, 0x00000001); + + aim_tx_enqueue(sess, fr); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * This is a bit confusing. + * + * Normal SNAC login goes like this: + * - connect + * - server sends flap version + * - client sends flap version + * - client sends screen name (17/6) + * - server sends hash key (17/7) + * - client sends auth request (17/2 -- aim_send_login) + * - server yells + * + * XOR login (for ICQ) goes like this: + * - connect + * - server sends flap version + * - client sends auth request which contains flap version (aim_send_login) + * - server yells + * + * For the client API, we make them implement the most complicated version, + * and for the simpler version, we fake it and make it look like the more + * complicated process. + * + * This is done by giving the client a faked key, just so we can convince + * them to call aim_send_login right away, which will detect the session + * flag that says this is XOR login and ignore the key, sending an ICQ + * login request instead of the normal SNAC one. + * + * As soon as AOL makes ICQ log in the same way as AIM, this is /gone/. + * + * XXX This may cause problems if the client relies on callbacks only + * being called from the context of aim_rxdispatch()... + * + */ +static int goddamnicq(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const char *sn) +{ + aim_frame_t fr; + aim_rxcallback_t userfunc; + + sess->flags &= ~AIM_SESS_FLAGS_SNACLOGIN; + sess->flags |= AIM_SESS_FLAGS_XORLOGIN; + + fr.conn = conn; + + if ((userfunc = aim_callhandler(sess, conn, 0x0017, 0x0007))) + userfunc(sess, &fr, ""); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * In AIM 3.5 protocol, the first stage of login is to request login from the + * Authorizer, passing it the screen name for verification. If the name is + * invalid, a 0017/0003 is spit back, with the standard error contents. If + * valid, a 0017/0007 comes back, which is the signal to send it the main + * login command (0017/0002). + * + */ +faim_export int aim_request_login(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const char *sn) +{ + aim_frame_t *fr; + aim_snacid_t snacid; + aim_tlvlist_t *tl = NULL; + + if (!sess || !conn || !sn) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((sn[0] >= '0') && (sn[0] <= '9')) + return goddamnicq(sess, conn, sn); + + sess->flags |= AIM_SESS_FLAGS_SNACLOGIN; + + aim_sendflapver(sess, conn); + + if (!(fr = aim_tx_new(sess, conn, AIM_FRAMETYPE_FLAP, 0x02, 10+2+2+strlen(sn)))) + return -ENOMEM; + + snacid = aim_cachesnac(sess, 0x0017, 0x0006, 0x0000, NULL, 0); + aim_putsnac(&fr->data, 0x0017, 0x0006, 0x0000, snacid); + + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0001, strlen(sn), sn); + aim_writetlvchain(&fr->data, &tl); + aim_freetlvchain(&tl); + + aim_tx_enqueue(sess, fr); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Part two of the ICQ hack. Note the ignoring of the key and clientinfo. + */ +static int goddamnicq2(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const char *sn, const char *password) +{ + static const char clientstr[] = {"ICQ Inc. - Product of ICQ (TM) 2000b.4.65.1.3281.85"}; + static const char lang[] = {"en"}; + static const char country[] = {"us"}; + aim_frame_t *fr; + aim_tlvlist_t *tl = NULL; + char *password_encoded; + + if (!(password_encoded = (char *) malloc(strlen(password)))) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!(fr = aim_tx_new(sess, conn, AIM_FRAMETYPE_FLAP, 0x01, 1152))) { + free(password_encoded); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + aim_encode_password(password, password_encoded); + + aimbs_put32(&fr->data, 0x00000001); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0001, strlen(sn), sn); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0002, strlen(password), password_encoded); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0003, strlen(clientstr), clientstr); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0016, 0x010a); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0017, 0x0004); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0018, 0x0041); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0019, 0x0001); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x001a, 0x0cd1); + aim_addtlvtochain32(&tl, 0x0014, 0x00000055); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x000f, strlen(lang), lang); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x000e, strlen(country), country); + + aim_writetlvchain(&fr->data, &tl); + + free(password_encoded); + aim_freetlvchain(&tl); + + aim_tx_enqueue(sess, fr); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * send_login(int socket, char *sn, char *password) + * + * This is the initial login request packet. + * + * NOTE!! If you want/need to make use of the aim_sendmemblock() function, + * then the client information you send here must exactly match the + * executable that you're pulling the data from. + * + * Latest WinAIM: + * clientstring = "AOL Instant Messenger (SM), version 4.3.2188/WIN32" + * major2 = 0x0109 + * major = 0x0400 + * minor = 0x0003 + * minor2 = 0x0000 + * build = 0x088c + * unknown = 0x00000086 + * lang = "en" + * country = "us" + * unknown4a = 0x01 + * + * Latest WinAIM that libfaim can emulate without server-side buddylists: + * clientstring = "AOL Instant Messenger (SM), version 4.1.2010/WIN32" + * major2 = 0x0004 + * major = 0x0004 + * minor = 0x0001 + * minor2 = 0x0000 + * build = 0x07da + * unknown= 0x0000004b + * + * WinAIM 3.5.1670: + * clientstring = "AOL Instant Messenger (SM), version 3.5.1670/WIN32" + * major2 = 0x0004 + * major = 0x0003 + * minor = 0x0005 + * minor2 = 0x0000 + * build = 0x0686 + * unknown =0x0000002a + * + * Java AIM 1.1.19: + * clientstring = "AOL Instant Messenger (TM) version 1.1.19 for Java built 03/24/98, freeMem 215871 totalMem 1048567, i686, Linus, #2 SMP Sun Feb 11 03:41:17 UTC 2001 2.4.1-ac9, IBM Corporation, 1.1.8, 45.3, Tue Mar 27 12:09:17 PST 2001" + * major2 = 0x0001 + * major = 0x0001 + * minor = 0x0001 + * minor2 = (not sent) + * build = 0x0013 + * unknown= (not sent) + * + * AIM for Linux 1.1.112: + * clientstring = "AOL Instant Messenger (SM)" + * major2 = 0x1d09 + * major = 0x0001 + * minor = 0x0001 + * minor2 = 0x0001 + * build = 0x0070 + * unknown= 0x0000008b + * serverstore = 0x01 + * + */ +faim_export int aim_send_login(aim_session_t *sess, aim_conn_t *conn, const char *sn, const char *password, struct client_info_s *clientinfo, const char *key) +{ + aim_frame_t *fr; + aim_tlvlist_t *tl = NULL; + fu8_t digest[16]; + aim_snacid_t snacid; + + if (!clientinfo || !sn || !password) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sess->flags & AIM_SESS_FLAGS_XORLOGIN) + return goddamnicq2(sess, conn, sn, password); + + if (!(fr = aim_tx_new(sess, conn, AIM_FRAMETYPE_FLAP, 0x02, 1152))) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (sess->flags & AIM_SESS_FLAGS_XORLOGIN) { + fr->hdr.flap.type = 0x01; + + /* Use very specific version numbers to further indicate hack */ + clientinfo->major2 = 0x010a; + clientinfo->major = 0x0004; + clientinfo->minor = 0x003c; + clientinfo->minor2 = 0x0001; + clientinfo->build = 0x0cce; + clientinfo->unknown = 0x00000055; + } + + snacid = aim_cachesnac(sess, 0x0017, 0x0002, 0x0000, NULL, 0); + aim_putsnac(&fr->data, 0x0017, 0x0002, 0x0000, snacid); + + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0001, strlen(sn), sn); + + aim_encode_password_md5(password, key, digest); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0025, 16, digest); + + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x0003, strlen(clientinfo->clientstring), clientinfo->clientstring); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0016, (fu16_t)clientinfo->major2); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0017, (fu16_t)clientinfo->major); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0018, (fu16_t)clientinfo->minor); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0019, (fu16_t)clientinfo->minor2); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x001a, (fu16_t)clientinfo->build); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x000e, strlen(clientinfo->country), clientinfo->country); + aim_addtlvtochain_raw(&tl, 0x000f, strlen(clientinfo->lang), clientinfo->lang); + aim_addtlvtochain16(&tl, 0x0009, 0x0015); + + aim_writetlvchain(&fr->data, &tl); + + aim_freetlvchain(&tl); + + aim_tx_enqueue(sess, fr); + + return 0; +} + +faim_export int aim_encode_password_md5(const char *password, const char *key, fu8_t *digest) +{ + md5_state_t state; + + md5_init(&state); + md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)key, strlen(key)); + md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)password, strlen(password)); + md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)AIM_MD5_STRING, strlen(AIM_MD5_STRING)); + md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)digest); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * aim_encode_password - Encode a password using old XOR method + * @password: incoming password + * @encoded: buffer to put encoded password + * + * This takes a const pointer to a (null terminated) string + * containing the unencoded password. It also gets passed + * an already allocated buffer to store the encoded password. + * This buffer should be the exact length of the password without + * the null. The encoded password buffer /is not %NULL terminated/. + * + * The encoding_table seems to be a fixed set of values. We'll + * hope it doesn't change over time! + * + * This is only used for the XOR method, not the better MD5 method. + * + */ +static int aim_encode_password(const char *password, fu8_t *encoded) +{ + fu8_t encoding_table[] = { +#if 0 /* old v1 table */ + 0xf3, 0xb3, 0x6c, 0x99, + 0x95, 0x3f, 0xac, 0xb6, + 0xc5, 0xfa, 0x6b, 0x63, + 0x69, 0x6c, 0xc3, 0x9f +#else /* v2.1 table, also works for ICQ */ + 0xf3, 0x26, 0x81, 0xc4, + 0x39, 0x86, 0xdb, 0x92, + 0x71, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0xe6, + 0x53, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x7c +#endif + }; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < strlen(password); i++) + encoded[i] = (password[i] ^ encoding_table[i]); + + return 0; +} + +/* * This is sent back as a general response to the login command. * It can be either an error or a success, depending on the * precense of certain TLVs.