view libpurple/protocols/zephyr/ZMkAuth.c @ 22411:d9105ead88dc

When purple_buddy_icons_set_account_icon() is called, it unrefs the old PurpleStoredImage and refs the new one. Previously, it notified the prpl of the change in the buddy icon before updating pointer_icon_cache, which meant that if the prpl then called purple_buddy_icons_find_account_icon() it would get the old PurpleStoredImage (which is at this point not only old but also a pointer to invalid memory if unref'ing it caused it to be destroyed). This happens in jabber_set_info() as of 2.4.0, causing a crash when setting no-buddy-icon for an account after it has previously had an icon. I think this also means that XMPP accounts in 2.4.0 will also always set serverside the *last* icon set, not the current one, when changing icons, but I didn't test that. The solution is simple: Update pointer_icon_cache earlier, setting the new img if there is one or removing the account entirely from the hash table if there isn't one now. This fixes both problems described above, making purple_buddy_icons_find_account_icon() return the new, current icon (or NULL) at all times.

/* This file is part of the Project Athena Zephyr Notification System.
 * It contains source for the ZMakeAuthentication function.
 *
 *	Created by:	Robert French
 *
 *	Copyright (c) 1987 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
 *	For copying and distribution information, see the file
 *	"mit-copyright.h". 
 */

#include "internal.h"

#ifndef ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb
#define ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb (39525376L)
#endif

#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
#ifdef WIN32

#else
#include <krb_err.h>
#endif
static long last_authent_time = 0L;
static KTEXT_ST last_authent;
#endif

#if 0
Code_t ZResetAuthentication () {
#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
    last_authent_time = 0L;
#endif
    return ZERR_NONE;
}
#endif

Code_t ZMakeAuthentication(notice, buffer, buffer_len, len)
    register ZNotice_t *notice;
    char *buffer;
    int buffer_len;
    int *len;
{
#ifdef ZEPHYR_USES_KERBEROS
    int result;
    time_t now;
    KTEXT_ST authent;
    char *cstart, *cend;
    ZChecksum_t checksum;
    CREDENTIALS cred;
    extern unsigned long des_quad_cksum();

    now = time(0);
    if (last_authent_time == 0 || (now - last_authent_time > 120)) {
	result = krb_mk_req(&authent, SERVER_SERVICE, 
			    SERVER_INSTANCE, __Zephyr_realm, 0);
	if (result != MK_AP_OK) {
	    last_authent_time = 0;
	    return (result+ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb);
        }
	last_authent_time = now;
	last_authent = authent;
    }
    else {
	authent = last_authent;
    }
    notice->z_auth = 1;
    notice->z_authent_len = authent.length;
    notice->z_ascii_authent = (char *)malloc((unsigned)authent.length*3);
    /* zero length authent is an error, so malloc(0) is not a problem */
    if (!notice->z_ascii_authent)
	return (ENOMEM);
    if ((result = ZMakeAscii(notice->z_ascii_authent, 
			     authent.length*3, 
			     authent.dat, 
			     authent.length)) != ZERR_NONE) {
	free(notice->z_ascii_authent);
	return (result);
    }
    result = Z_FormatRawHeader(notice, buffer, buffer_len, len, &cstart,
			       &cend);
    free(notice->z_ascii_authent);
    notice->z_authent_len = 0;
    if (result)
	return(result);

    /* Compute a checksum over the header and message. */
    if ((result = krb_get_cred(SERVER_SERVICE, SERVER_INSTANCE, 
			      __Zephyr_realm, &cred)) != 0)
	return result;
    checksum = des_quad_cksum(buffer, NULL, cstart - buffer, 0, (C_Block *)cred.session);
    checksum ^= des_quad_cksum(cend, NULL, buffer + *len - cend, 0,
			       (C_Block *)cred.session);
    checksum ^= des_quad_cksum(notice->z_message, NULL, notice->z_message_len,
			       0, (C_Block *)cred.session);
    notice->z_checksum = checksum;
    ZMakeAscii32(cstart, buffer + buffer_len - cstart, checksum);

    return (ZERR_NONE);
#else
    notice->z_checksum = 0;
    notice->z_auth = 1;
    notice->z_authent_len = 0;
    notice->z_ascii_authent = "";
    return (Z_FormatRawHeader(notice, buffer, buffer_len, len, NULL, NULL));
#endif
}